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AGING AIRCRAFT AND FATIGUE FAILURE
P.F. PACKMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
ALL AIRCRAFT are subjected to loads and environ-
ments that will reduce the structural strength of criti-
cal components of the airframe and engine over time.
Recent inflight structural failures of commercial aircraft
focused the public's attention on the technical problems
of aging aircraft.
In June 1988, an accident involving an Aloha Airlines
737jet and several incidents in December 1988 involving
Eastern Airlines 727 aircraft2 prompted media and indus-
* Professor Packman received his M.S. and Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering
from Syracuse University. He presently is a professor of mechanical and materials
engineering at Southern Methodist University.
The Aloha Airlines 737 was flying at 24,000 feet when the entire upper fuse-
lage ripped away. Ott & O'Lone, 737 Fuselage Separation Spurs Review of Safeguards,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 9, 1988, at 92. The accident occurred because of a
failure in aging stringers, which are the stiffeners in the fuselage. Id. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) responded by issuing directives ordering in-
creased inspection of the 737s. Id. More than 350 aging 737s are affected by the
directives. Id. at 93. The only fatality in the Aloha Airlines incident was a veteran
flight attendant who was swept out of the aircraft when the fuselage failed. Id. at
94. Since the accident, Aloha Airlines retired all four of its Boeing 737s, even
though the company believes that the aircraft, which have 70,000 to 90,000 flight
miles, are airworthy. Safety of Aging Aircraft Undergoes Reassessment, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., May 16, 1988, at 16. Apparently the Aloha 737s are more susceptible to
problems because they are used for short, over-water routes, which cause more
corrosion on the aircraft. Id. For further details of the accident, see Shapiro, "The
Plane was Disintegrating", TIME, May 9, 1988, at 38.
2 One of the Eastern Airlines accidents involved a 727 that lost pressure at
31,000 feet after a hole opened in the upper rear part of the fuselage. Investigators
Suspect Faulty Repair as Cause of 727 Fuselage Failure, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 2,
1989, at 107. The crack in the 727 developed at a lap splice where the metal
portions of the fuselage are riveted together. Id. The older aircraft in the Boeing
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try-wide reassessments of the issues relating to the safety
of aging commercial aircraft. The Aloha and Eastern Air-
lines incidents involved cracking of the fuselage structure,
which resulted in rapid decompression and structural
damage. In the Aloha Airlines case, a portion of the top
half of the fuselage section detached from the aircraft at
24,000 feet.4  The aircraft was an early model 737-200
that had accumulated approximately 88,000 takeoff and
landing cycles in its twenty-year history.5 The Eastern
Airlines 727s, one of which developed a fourteen-inch
crack that forced an emergency descent from 31,000 feet,
were also approximately twenty years old.6
The Aloha Airlines jet was an early model that com-
bined a "cold adhesive bond" with three rows of counter-
sunk rivets in the design of the fuselage splice.7 Figure 1
in Appendix A illustrates the areas of the aircraft in-
volved.8 Boeing later changed from the cold adhesive
fleet used a cold-bonding process to lap splice the fuselage. Id. This process
came under attack after the Aloha Airlines incident, prompting the FAA to issue
directives to alert inspectors to carefully examine the process. FAA Proposes Checks
for Cracks on 727s, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 16, 1989, at 63. The FAA pro-
posed an extensive rivet replacement program for the Boeing 737 and considered
proposals for the 727 and 747. Id.; see also FAA Safety Directives Issued for Boeing
737s, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 28, 1988, at IA, col. I [hereinafter FAA Safety
Directives].
.1 See supra notes 1 and 2 for a discussion of the structural failures of these jets;
see also Incidents Spur Concern About Age of Planes, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 28,
1988, at A-3, col. 1 (providing further information regarding the structural
failures).
4 See supra note 1 for a discussion of the Aloha Airlines accident.
See supra note 1 for further discussion of the Aloha Airlines accident.
See supra note 2. Eastern has had prior problems with its aircraft. See, e.g.,
Eastern DC-9 Splits Open in Hard Landing at Pensacola, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan.
4, 1988, at 68; 727 Emergency Exacerbates Beleaguered Eastern's Woes, Dallas Morning
News, Dec. 28, 1988, at 4A, col. 1.
I FAA Safety Directives, supra note 2, at 12A, col. 5. The countersunk rivets are
used to join the upper and lower aluminum skins of the aircraft shell in a manner
similar to shingles on a roof. This design is especially susceptible to cracking
when the rivet angle changes in flight. Id.
I FAA to Require Fuselage Repairs in Older 737Jets, N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1988, at
Al, col. 3. The rivets indicated in Figure I join the upper skin to the lower skin
near stringers, which are metal strips forming part of the shell of the airplane.
The old countersunk rivet tends to cause cracks in the skin where the rivet angle
changes, while the newly specified buttonhead rivet eliminates any changes in the
rivet angle. Note that only the top row of rivets in the three existing rows is
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bond to a hot adhesive bond after manufacturing its 291 st
aircraft. Boeing implemented an improved hot bonding
after manufacturing its 464th jet, which apparently cor-
rected the problem.9 No subsequent significant cracking
or disbonding has been reported in the 737. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) issued rules in October
1988 to modify the structure of older 737s by replacing
the first row of rivets with buttonhead-type rather than
countersunk rivets.' 0
In its review, the FAA also stated that some early mod-
els of the Boeing 727 and 747 incorporated cold adhesive
bonding techniques as well as countersunk rivets. The
FAA is considering issuing airworthiness directives for
these aircraft as well." The Aloha Airlines accident
prompted industry-wide reassessment of the technical,
managerial, and economic issues relating to aging aircraft.
The FAA sponsored an industry-wide conference in June
targeted for replacement. Id. Figure 1 in Appendix A illustrates the buttonhead
rivet, which is not as susceptible to angle change as the countersunk rivet dis-
cussed in note 7.
See FAA Safety Directives, supra note 2, at 12A, col. 5.
Airworthiness Directives: Boeing Model 737 Series Airplanes, 53 Fed. Reg.
44,156 (1988) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 39.13). The new directives include
several modifications of procedures for external inspection of the fuselage skin at
lap joints: (1) substitution of high frequency eddy current inspections for the cur-
rent visual inspections for cracks; (2) paint stripping prior to inspection unless the
rivet fastener is clearly visible through the paint and there are not more than two
coats of paint on the airplane skin; (3) chemical stripping of paint rather than
sandblasting; (4) retention of the threshold for external inspection of the lap
joints at 40,000 landings for the first 291 Boeing 737s manufactured; (5) other
modifications of timing for internal inspections; and (6) restriction of cabin pres-
sures until initial inspections are completed to reduce stresses on fuselage skins.
Id. at 44,156-58. These directives became effective November 21, 1988. Id. at
44,160. A similar directive concerning external inspection of circumferential fu-
selage splices and internal inspection of certain bonded doublers for delamina-
tion, cracking and corrosion was issued at the same time. See Airworthiness
Directives: Boeing Model 737 Series Airplanes, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,160 (1988) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. § 39.13).
11 Airworthiness Directives: Boeing Model 747 Series Airplanes, 54 Fed. Reg.
7446 (1989). This proposal constitutes a new airworthiness directive requiring
inspection of skin joints in the fuselage upper lobe for skin cracks and corrosion.
This new proposal was prompted by service experience indicating that the cold
adhesive bond used in the first 200 Boeing 747s had disbonded on some models.
Id. Comments were received by the FAA through April 1, 1989, with codification
later in 1989. Id.; see also FAA Safety Directives, supra note 2, at IA, Col. 1.
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1988 to discuss these issues.12
Figure 2 in Appendix A depicts the age of some of the
older commercial aircraft presently in use.' 3 The average
age of these older aircraft is about twenty years. Even
with the introduction of recent aircraft designs, such as
the Boeing 757 and 767 and the Airbus A320, the average
age of the United States commercial fleet is more than
12.5 years. It is estimated that approximately 2,300 jet-
liners in service are over twenty years old.14 Aviation in-
dustry engineers and government regulators acknowledge
that the commercial jet fleet is growing older. They fur-
ther acknowledge that added precautions will be needed
to monitor the cracking and other problems that can de-
velop on these older jets. No one will agree or will com-
ment, however, on real or potential loss of safety for these
aging aircraft.15
The difficult technical problem is determining what can
be done to improve or maintain the safety, reliability, and
durability of aging airplanes. The cost of replacing them
is extremely high. The waiting list for new aircraft is so
long that current aircraft must continue to fly for at least
five years. The cost of significantly increased mainte-
nance can become prohibitive; yet the cost of failure is un-
acceptable. Two questions face aviation specialists. The
first is whether there is a loss in safety for aging aircraft.
The second is whether current technology, inspections,
and maintenance programs can cope with the aging air-
craft problem.
This paper presents a review of some of the technical
problems associated with maintaining an adequate level of
12 FAA to Address Aloha Conference, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 23, 1988, at 103.
11 Many early models of the Boeing 707 (471), McDonnell Douglas DC-8 (350),
and Lockheed L-199 (53) are still in service and will be 30 years old in 1989.
Incidents Spur Concern About Age of Planes, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 28, 1988, at A-
3, col. 1.
14 See generally Fischetti & Perry, Our Burdened Skies, IEEE SPECTRUM, Nov. 1986,
at 36 (providing background information on design, aircraft maintenance, air traf-
fic control systems, and wind shear detection advances, as well as design and man-
ufacture standards for aircraft).
- Id. at 73-74.
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safety and reliability for aging aircraft. The review consid-
ers three major areas: (1) the safety inherent in the design
of critical load-carrying aircraft structures; (2) the inspec-
tion maintenance schedules; and (3) the ability to increase
the durability of the aging aircraft.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND: DESIGN
A. Fatigue Design for Airframes
The primary load-carrying structure of an aircraft sees a
large number of loads that vary during each flight. These
loads can be classified roughly as (1) ground loads, (2)
low- and high-speed taxi loads, (3) takeoff loads, (4) gust
loads, (5) maneuver loads, and (6) landing loads. Each of
these loads is representative of the particular phase of op-
eration that the aircraft structure experiences. One com-
plete sequence of loads during a single flight is called the
ground-air-ground (GAG) cycle.
The design of an aircraft component is based on the
ability to predict the time or number of load applications
over which the component parts of the airframe will be
able to resist these loads. Consider a simple example of a
pressurized aircraft fuselage. During each flight the fuse-
lage is pressurized with a pressure differential depending
on the altitude of the aircraft. When it is on the ground
with its doors open, the pressure differential is zero. The
differential increases as the aircraft gains altitude. Thus,
the fuselage sees at least one zero-maximum-zero pres-
sure cycle for each flight. 16
The fuselage is loaded with the GAG cycle for each
flight. Each of the materials, joints, connections, and
other parts of the structure is subjected to a phenomenon
called fatigue. The fatigue of materials is a progressive
degradation and loss in a structure's load-carrying capac-
, This structure also experiences loads during takeoff and maneuvering that
are introduced through the wing structure or the landing gear system. For the
purposes of this analysis, however, the GAG cycle will be the only loading
considered.
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ity due to the initiation and growth of small crack-like
flaws within the structure. Fatigue has been the subject of
continuous and strenuous research. While a great deal of
information is known about the phenomenon, at present
many aspects of fatigue are not completely understood.' 7
The possibility of fatigue failure in a pressurized fuse-
lage was first recognized by the loss of an early de Havil-
land Comet 1 aircraft.' 8 These types of failures were
determined to be due to fatigue cracks growing in the skin
originating out of a window cut-out. The cracks grew
slowly for a period of time because of the then unprece-
dented cabin pressure differential of nearly nine pounds
per square inch combined with the fatigue cycles imposed
by the GAG cycles. When the crack reached a certain size,
it propagated rapidly, destroying the fuselage structure
and the aircraft. A similar problem occurred in a cargo
transport aircraft, where pressure pulses from the tips of
the propeller blades caused the fatigue cracking.' 9 Fa-
tigue failure originating in an improper repair of the rear
pressure bulkhead, and subsequent initiation and growth
of a fatigue crack by the GAG pressurization cycle caused
the recent crash of a Japan Airlines 747.
Fatigue failures are not limited to the fuselage struc-
ture. Wing structures may fail because of fatigue caused
by maneuver loads or landing loads. In addition, landing
loads or taxi loads may cause fatigue in landing gear
structures. Fatigue failures of wing flap, aileron, elevator,
and rudder hinges and other major structural compo-
, See generally C. OSGOOD, FATIGUE DESIGN, (1982), for an explanation of the
different technical approaches to determine the most appropriate way to measure
individual characteristic responses to fatigue. The book presents a practical
method for the prediction of fatigue life under different stress conditions and
highlights a prediction of fatigue approach that gauges potential damage by the
numerical crack-life standard.
1" Address by L.J. Hart-Smith, Adhesive Bonding of Aircraft Primary Struc-
tures, to the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Aerospace Congress & Expo-
sition in Los Angeles, Cal. (Oct. 13-16, 1980) [hereinafter Hart-Smith] (available
from Professor Packman at Southern Methodist University).
- Id. In the McDonnell Douglas C-133 Cargomaster transport aircraft, pres-
sure pulses from the propeller blades, rather than structural stress concentration,
caused the cracks. Id.
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nents that are subjected to varying loads also have been
reported. Furthermore, the turbine engine and other ro-
tating components, blades, disks, and gears are subject to
fatigue failure. Propellers, flight instruments, and other
equipment may also see fatigue cycles. Fatigue combined
with corrosion presents a more serious problem. It is esti-
mated that more than seventy percent of the cracking that
develops in aircraft is due to fatigue or fatigue-corrosion.
Most structural failures in cyclically loaded structures,
such as helicopters, automobiles, and power plant equip-
ment, are due to fatigue, with or without corrosive envi-
ronmental effects.
Figure 3 in Appendix A illustrates the general fatigue
problem associated with aircraft. This curve plots a mea-
sure of strength, which is in pounds per square inch ver-
sus time or cycles of loading. The one-time-load or static
strength of the typical structure is given as the ultimate
load for that structure. For a large number of applied cy-
cles, no decrease is observable in the residual or remain-
ing static strength of the structure. As the number of
applied cycles of load increases, the material begins to
lose strength due to the cyclic loading. The residual static
strength begins to decrease, slowly at first, then with in-
creasing rapidity. When the value of the residual static
strength falls below eighty percent of the structure's origi-
nal unfatigued residual static strength of the structure, the
structure is considered unsafe and must be withdrawn
from service. Withdrawal is necessary because the com-
ponent might experience a load equal to eighty percent of
the original residual static strength of the structure some-
time during a single flight. If this load were encountered,
the structure now weakened by the cyclic loading would
not be able to withstand the applied loading and would
fail.
In Figure 4 of Appendix A, one can plot the growth of a
defect that is responsible for the loss in residual static
strength. The defect, whether a single crack or multiple
cracks, may be either present in the material when the
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component is introduced into service or initiated in the
material after a period of usage. The crack size is plotted
as a function of the time or cycles of applied load. For the
initial portion of the life of the component, the cracks are
either stable or growing very slowly. After a period of
time the growth rate of the crack increases, and the in-
creased rate corresponds to the decrease in residual static
strength, resulting in the curve shown in Figure 3 of Ap-
pendix A. Thus, the determination of the life of the com-
ponent due to cyclic loading is related to the initiation
and growth of crack-like defects within the structure.
Three concepts provide the basis for the design philos-
ophy used to minimize the potential for premature failure
by fatigue of commercial, general aviation, and military
aircraft: (1) safe life; (2) fail safe; and (3) damage toler-
ance. 20 Durability and economic life analysis are two ad-
ditional concepts taken into account to complete the U.S.
Air Force's approach to structural integrity. 2' These con-
cepts are important for understanding the problem of an
aging commercial aircraft fleet, and the need for future
aircraft designs.
1. Safe Life
The concept of safe life in fatigue design is predicated
on the assumption that scatter exists in the fatigue life.
An analysis of Figure 4 in Appendix A shows that predict-
ing the increase in crack size over a period of time is
2-1 See Ekvall, Burssat, Liu & Creager, Preliminary Design ofAircraft Structures to Meet
Structural Integrity Requirements, IIJ. AIRCRAFT 136 (1974) (concluding that existing
methodology has been demonstrated as sufficient to permit damage tolerance cri-
teria to be formally considered in the design of primary aircraft structure); see infra
notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of safe life, damage tolerant,
fail safe, and slow crack growth design concepts.
'2- See Gallagher, Grandt & Crane, Tracking Potential Crack Growth Damage in the
U.S. Air Force Aircraft, 1IJ. AIRCRAFr 435 (1978) (within the concept of economic
life analysis is the "current U.S. Air Force ASIP [Aircraft Structural Integrity Pro-
gram] Force Management policy [which] is based on a desire to anticipate and
control cracking problems throughout the service life of the airframe structure.");
Gallagher & Stalnaker, Developing Normalized Crack Growth Curves for Tracking Damage
in Aircraft, II J. AIRCRAFr 114 (1978) (the Air Force evolved a design philosophy
which assumes that cracks are present initially in airframes).
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based on the knowledge of the cyclic loads that produce
the incremental crack propagation. For a single structure
in which the GAG pressurization cycle is well defined,
such as a pressurized fuselage, this knowledge may be
principally deterministic. The analysis would not be as
simple for a wing structure or a landing gear structure
whose actual loading and loading sequence is determined
by random factors such as gust loads or rate of descent to
touchdown. In many cases the magnitude, number, and
sequencing of the fatigue cycles must be estimated before
the aircraft is designed. This concept of a "mission load-
exceedence profile," which is used to determine the fa-
tigue cycles on a component of the aircraft, is a continu-
ous design reiteration process that continues well into the
aircraft's service life.22
In such a random loading, the life or number of cycles
to the point where the residual static strength has de-
creased would not result in a single value. Instead, the
calculations would exhibit considerable scatter about
some predicted mean life. Figure 5 in Appendix A plots
the life, either in time or cycles, against the probability of
failure. The mean life prediction is based on unflawed
laboratory specimen data and a fatigue cumulative dam-
22 See C. Heikkenen, Improved Aircraft Readiness Through Advanced Durabil-
ity Analysis and Improved Material Quality, (April 29, 1988) (unpublished report
to Professor Paul Packman for CME 6362, available from Professor Packman at
Southern Methodist University). Heikkenen's paper discusses durability analysis,
which is a means of estimating crack growth damage for a population of structural
details. See generally Ott, Independent Research Urged for Inspection, MVaintenance, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., June 20, 1988, at 112 [hereinafter Independent Research Urged].
Ott relates a discussion with Ray Valeika, vice president of maintenance and engi-
neering at Pan American World Airways. Valeika believes that aircraft have the
potential of operating safely within a system of government and industry regula-
tion. Id. at 113. Although many believe that aircraft maintenance is reactionary in
nature, the present system is actually a continual process of inspection, with the
key being finding the first crack. Id. at 112. Ott describes some of the different
levels of inspection that Pan American implemented in an effort to ensure that its
aircraft operate safely. Id. at 113. Although Valeika believes that safe operations
can be achieved through government regulation, he thinks that an agency other
than the FAA should undertake the necessary research and development pro-
grams. Id. He also believes that one agency "shouldn't do the testing and make
the rules." Id. (emphasis added).
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age analysis called Miner's Rule. To ensure that the ac-
tual component will not fail, the useful design life is
considered to be one-fourth of the predicted mean life.
Thus, if we want an aircraft fuselage to withstand 10,000
GAG cycles, the structure should be designed to with-
stand 40,000 GAG cycles. To verify the design, the struc-
tural components are tested in a controlled laboratory
environment to verify the 40,000 GAG cycle life.
A scatter factor multiple of four is assumed to account
for the effect of variations in: (1) the initial quality of the
manufactured components and materials; (2) the effects
of the environment; (3) variations in material properties
due to production and passage of time; and (4) variations
in the load levels and load sequences encountered by the
aircraft itself.23
The test article for acceptance testing is an actual air-
craft, whose acceptance criterion will be no failure in four
lifetimes. The structure tested for acceptance is moni-
tored carefully during the test period, and often well be-
yond the initial acceptance test period. The time of
appearance and location of any cracks or defects in the
exemplar structure is noted. These problem areas are
scheduled for maintenance inspections at regular inter-
vals, which usually are equal to one-fourth of the time the
cracking in the exemplar test structure is noted. The
length of these inspection intervals is maintained, or de-
creased, for the remainder of the aircraft service life. Re-
pair procedures are designed for each specific area. If the
problem appears widespread, a modification or redesign
is carried out. Current FAA requirements for the rede-
sign and repair of the 737 splice structure involved in the
Aloha Airlines incident are adaptations of such a
procedure.24
-' See, C. Heikkenen, supra note 22, at 8-12 (discussing mathematical calcula-
tions and formulas necessary for the prediction of crack growth and fatigue). The
extent of crack damage can be estimated quantitatively at any service time by us-
ing advanced durability analysis. Id. at 13.
2 See Ott, Airlines, Manufacturers Propose Plan to Ensure Safety of Aging Fleet, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., June 6, 1988, at 88 (discussing the task-oriented program pro-
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The major shortcomings of the safe life design concept
are significant. A test article can exhibit a life considera-
bly longer than any individual aircraft in the fleet. Figure
6 in Appendix A demonstrates an example of poor corre-
lation between test article life and actual service life. Fleet
structures are designed so that a test article has a life of
400,000 hours. The acceptable design life for the fleet it-
self is 100,000 hours of operation, which amounts to
about fifteen years of operation with a scatter factor of
four on design life. A single structural component, how-
ever, may contain a small flaw that can rapidly grow to a
size capable of causing early failure well before the end of
the 100,000-hour design life. For example, in several mil-
itary aircraft, a number of catastrophic structural failures
that were caused by initial crack-like defects were not de-
tected during manufacturing or service inspections. Fig-
ure 7 in Appendix A summarizes examples of early service
life failures.
2. Damage-Tolerant Design
The safe life approach is still the primary design pro-
cess for the sizing and analysis of aircraft components.
The next step in the development of safe designs for air-
craft incorporates the concept of "a damage-tolerant de-
sign." This concept assumes that the production
component contains crack-like defects when it is initially
introduced into service. The design is predicated on the
structure's tolerance to the presence of damage, which is
its ability to withstand the presence of these defects.
posed by the airlines and manufacturers at an FAA conference on the safety of
aging commercial aircraft); see generally Ott, and O'Lone, supra note 1, at 92 (dis-
cussing the Aloha Airlines accident); see also FAA Safety Directives, supra note 2,
at IA, col. 1, (discussing the FAA directives that resulted from the Aloha Airlines
accident, which "call for an altitude restriction of 26,000 feet for all Boeing 737s
that have completed more than 40,000 landings until the planes pass inspection
.... "). The Aloha Airlines accident caused the government to reassess mainte-
nance and inspection programs for aging aircraft. See supra note 1 for further dis-
cussion of the Aloha Airlines accident.
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Damage-tolerant design is divided roughly into two gen-
eral areas: (1) fail-safe and (2) slow crack growth.
a. Fail-Safe
Figure 8 in Appendix A illustrates the basic concept of a
fail-safe structure with four tension-loaded panels. The
structure is designed to contain a single member failure
without resulting loss of the aircraft. In this case, the
structure is designed to survive a crack that grows com-
pletely across one of the four panels. Lower wing surface
panels, fuselage stringer skin structures, and horizontal
and vertical fin attachment structures are all designed to
be fail-safe. Fail-safe structure allows for crack growth up
to a certain size, as illustrated in Figure 8 in Appendix A.
These cracks should be detected and repaired before fur-
ther cracking occurs. If some crack growth remains unde-
tected, there should be sufficient backup or redundant
structure to carry the total load. Certain aircraft compo-
nents obviously cannot be made fail-safe, including
hinges, landing gear systems, and flap tracks. These must
be designed by alternate procedures.
Full-scale and component fatigue testing for fail-safe
design includes both constant amplitude and spectrum
loading. This results in the best comparison of the esti-
mated life to the actual life of components, as well as ver-
ification of fail-safe performance. Many representational
structural components are tested against a flight-by-flight
spectrum, usually prior to aircraft certification. Any
cracks discovered during these tests are allowed to pro-
gress in order to obtain crack growth rates and to verify
that the structure is fail-safe. Repairs for damage in-
curred during the test are designed to restore the struc-
ture's fatigue and static strength and are usually
incorporated into the repair manual for the structure.
b. Slow Crack Growth
Slow crack growth design assumes that initial defects are
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present in the structure at the inception of service.25 It further
assumes that fatigue created during the service GAG cy-
cles will grow to a point where these defects might even-
tually cause failure or require replacement of the
component. The structure is designed and inspected to
prevent the maximum anticipated initial damage from
growing into a critical size during the service life. The
slow crack growth design is illustrated in Figure 9 in Ap-
pendix A. This design is typical of components that can-
not be designed to fail safe criteria.
The critical size that would cause the failure of the com-
ponent at eighty percent of the residual strength load is
calculated. The required design life is calculated to be ap-
proximately eighty percent of the estimated time to fail-
ure. The fatigue mission spectrum is used to calculate the
rate of crack growth per hour of flight, using the fatigue
crack propagation properties of the material. The
number of flight hours for each individual aircraft is
tracked, and the aircraft is repaired or withdrawn from
service at the designated design life.
The structure's safety depends upon the assumption
that no flaws larger than the maximum initial size used in
the calculations will form. Figure 10 in Appendix A shows
values that are used for the size of the initial damage used
in the design. Several different levels of initial damage
are allowed, depending upon the structure's level of criti-
cality. If at the onset of service, a flaw in a part is larger
than the flaw sizes assumed in the initial design, that flaw
may cause the part to fail before the required design life
expires. To ensure that no parts with flaws larger than
2.' See Gallagher & Stalnaker, supra note 21, at 114 (discussing the Air Force
design philosophy which assumes that cracks in an airframe are present initially).
See generally Independent Research Urged, supra note 22, at 122 (discussing mathemat-
ical calculations and formulas necessary for the prediction of crack growth and
fatigue). Airlines are implementing new inspection, maintenance, and repair pro-
cedures. For example, a B-Level inspection for corrosion and fatigue damage
takes place every 1,000 hours. Id. at 113. A more detailed D-Level inspection,
which involves replacement of aging parts, occurs approximately every four years.
Id. Knowing that initial defects are present in a structure allows for incorporation
of the service involved in the B-Level and D-Level inspections. Id.
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the initial maximum design flaw size are utilized, a frac-
ture control program is used to inspect each part through
nondestructive inspection (NDI). A careful analysis en-
sures a high probability that any flaw larger than the initial
flaw will be found. Figure 11 in Appendix A shows a
curve determining the probability of detecting crack-like
defects as a function of the defect size by NDI inspection
during manufacturing. Obviously, larger flaws have a
higher probability of being detected.
At best, the calculation of fatigue-induced crack growth
behavior is complex. It must include a wide spectrum of
variables, including loads, structural geometry, structural
response, material properties, and level of manufacture.
Each of these variables affects the initiation time and rate
of crack propagation. The variability in the response of
materials to a complicated s tress-time-temperature-corro-
sion environment is particularly important. Scatter in the
fatigue performance of materials exposed to a well-de-
fined load environment is well documented. Because of
the localized nature of fatigue damage and the difficulty of
detecting damage in structural details, some degree of
damage tolerance is usually built into the surrounding
structure.
B. Conclusions Regarding Design
The significant design features developed in the previ-
ous sections are incorporated into most of the critical
structural components of commercial and military aircraft
flying today. Some of these features were available and in-
corporated into aircraft designed more than twenty years
ago; these features have contributed significantly to the
high level of safety of the structure. Newer aircraft de-
signs follow the same philosophical concepts and proce-
dures. Improvements to structural designs have resulted
from more sophisticated computations and advances in
materials and processes, rather than from major changes
in design procedures.
In many cases, these design features are conservative.
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Several incidents, such as the Aloha Airlines fuselage fail-
ure and failures due to heavy overstressing caused by tur-
bulence, show that the airframe structure has more than
an adequate margin of safety built into the design. Design
and manufacturing features that make incremental im-
provements in strength and safety are usually incorpo-
rated into later production models of the same series of
aircraft. These incorporations further refine and improve
the initial quality of the materials and calculations for fa-
tigue life. For example, Boeing engineers were able to es-
timate the possibility that an early design 737 fuselage
would fail between 87,000 and 91,000 total cycles. The
Aloha Airlines 737 had 89,680 cycles at the time of the
accident.
Older aircraft are apparently designed as safely as mod-
ern aircraft. If one considers only the design aspects, there is
no inherent decrease in safety as an aircraft ages. The dif-
ficulty lies in the fact that older aircraft have been sub-
jected to more fatigue cycles, and there is a substantial
increase in the probability that the older aircraft have sus-
tained more fatigue damage and cracking. Thus, the bur-
den for continued safety shifts from the design to the maintenance
and inspection process. The structure's safety depends upon
the detection and removal of defective structural compo-
nents during routine maintenance. Structural design fea-




A series of nondestructive inspections must be per-
formed on each critical part used in the aircraft to ensure
that the component's life will comply with the anticipated
design life. Nondestructive inspection (NDI) or
nondestructive testing (NDT) can be defined as inspection
processes that can determine the acceptability or fitness
for purpose of a part without destruction of the part. In
most cases the ability of the NDT to detect the presence
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of a crack or crack-like defect must be assessed. The ma-
jority of NDI procedures fall within one of the following
categories:
(1) visual or low magnification optical inspections.
These may include specialized optical techniques used to
enhance the image, or may include such procedures as
liquid crystals, laser holography, interferometry, or com-
puter enhancements;
(2) x-ray or penetrating radiation coupled with visual
examination of the film;
(3) visible or fluorescent dye penetrant inspection in
which surface defects reveal their presence during subse-
quent visual examination of the treated component;
(4) magnetic particle, visible, or fluorescent dye inspec-
tion. The part is magnetized and crack-like defects pro-
duce pseudo-magnetic poles, which attract magnetic or
fluorescent coated particles. These reveal surface or
slightly subsurface defects during visual inspection;
(5) ultrasonic inspection in which high frequency waves
are reflected from surface or internal defects and produce
an indication of the reflection on a cathode ray screen.
This process requires information and knowledge of the
types of reflections possible;
(6) eddy current inspection, in which a high frequency
surface wave interaction with a surface or slightly subsur-
face defect results in perturbation of the electromagnetic
field. This field perturbation is detected by a receiving coil
and produces an indication. The process requires infor-
mation about and knowledge of the types of electromag-
netic perturbations that are possible in the material; and
(7) acoustic emission procedures, in which stressing
the component containing the defect causes the defect to
enlarge slightly. The defect then emits a stress wave
pulse, which can be detected by pressure transducers
placed on the part.
The primary purpose of these inspections is to ensure
that defects of a size or criticality larger than a preselected
design maximum will be detected by the NDT and that
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the component containing these defects will be repaired
or removed from service. The objective of the NDT is to
achieve a level of competence and assurance consistent
with the design requirements. Many levels of inspection
take place during the initial manufacturing and subse-
quent service life. These inspections may include: (1) in-
spections performed on the raw materials prior to
producing the finished part, which are usually conducted
by the producer of the raw material; (2) inspection of the
intermediate semifinished product, which is usually per-
formed by the manufacturer or intermediate producers;
(3) inspection of the product during various stages of its
final manufacture, which is performed by subcontractors
and the overall manufacturer; (4) acceptance inspection of
the component after assembly into the aircraft structure,
which is usually conducted by the producer and buyer; (5)
periodic, routine inspection, which is usually carried out
by the user or a subcontractor; (6) maintenance repair
and A-, B-, C- or D-Level check and inspection, which is
usually conducted by the user or subcontractor; and (7)
special inspections to comply with Airworthiness Direc-
tives (AD) or service bulletins.
A. Inspection Plans
The primary manufacturer often produces a complete
NDI plan covering the product cycle from design to ser-
vice. Portions of the plan are provided to the user as a
part of the purchase package. The complete inspection
program usually covers specifications, research develop-
ment, fabrication, NDI and field service manuals, field in-
spections, and teardown inspections.26
Nondestructive inspection philosophy for military air-
2i See D. Hagemaier, State-of-the-Art Inspection of Aircraft Structures (1975)
(unpublished manuscript) (available from Professor Packman at Southern Meth-
odist University). The different phases of inspection are summarized briefly as
follows:
(1) Specifications: Specifications contain requirements and procedures for qualifi-
cations, standardization, calibration, control of equipment, and personnel qualifi-
cation requirements. These specifications are coordinated prior to release by
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craft is different from that of commercial aircraft. In gen-
eral, the military aircraft requirements are usually more
demanding. 27 This usually is because the military struc-
ture is operated at higher stress levels and requires the
early detection of considerably smaller flaws than com-
mercial aircraft.
Most inspections in the field and in commercial accept-
ance areas are performed by certified inspectors in ac-
cordance with MIL-STD-41D or SNT-TC-1A. These
inspection standards are limited to eddy current, mag-
netic particle, penetrant, radiography using radioactive
isotopes, and x-ray. Vendor personnel are usually quali-
fied by the vendor or an independent agent.28
engineering, quality assurance, and other applicable departments. All NDI must
be performed according to these specifications.
(2) Research and Development: During the development phase of the program, the
capabilities of NDI to detect flaws in new materials are tested. Among the items
considered in the effort to apply NDI correctly are the structural component to be
inspected, critical area within each component, maximum allowable flaw size, crit-
ical flaw orientation, proper NDT method to be used, and the proper time in the
manufacturing sequence to apply NDI.
(3) Fabrication: This is the process by which NDI is applied to either vendor-
produced or in-house parts. Fabrication is a detailed written procedure that is
performed by qualified personnel pursuant to guidelines set out in the applicable
process specifications. This procedure includes an identification and recording
system which requires that either the parts themselves or the records accompany-
ing the parts be marked after inspection.
(4) VD1 lanual: This manual sets forth NDI technique development, which
must be applied whenever the NDI method (a) improves safe operation, (b) saves
maintenance costs or manpower, or (c) increases operational effectiveness of the
aircraft. The NDI Manual defines the area to be inspected, specific components to
be inspected, location of the component, access to the area to be inspected, prep-
aration of that area, methods and techniques of evaluating components for de-
fects, equipment to be used, and reference standards for standardizing test
sensitivity.
(5) Field Service .Mlanuals: These are other manuals or technical orders, besides
the NDI Manual, containing requirements for ND!. Although these manuals do
not give NDI procedures, they may (a) give sufficient information for a mechanic
to service a system, (b) call for inspection checks, (c) contain acceptance criteria
for certain defects, or (d) give requirements to perform certain inspections at
specified times. Some examples of these manuals include the Maintenance In-
structions, Component Maintenance Manual, Structural Repair Instructions,
Structural Repair Manual, Inspection Requirements, and Line and Dock Manual.
ld.
d' Id. at 2.
21 See id. at 4.
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B. Factors Influencing Defect Detectability
The only way the NDT engineer and inspector can de-
termine if an applicable instrumented NDT test method,
such as eddy current or ultrasonics, will detect the desig-
nated minimum flaw is to have a reference standard with
built-in defects of known dimensions. Calibrated notches
or holes provide a minimum sensitivity level and indicate
defect resolution. A reference standard based on geomet-
ric defects (holes, notches, or slots) is not necessarily
identical to the tight crack-like defect or corrosion defect
that often is found in aircraft having a large amount of
flying hours. The proper selection of ultrasonic and eddy
current testing permits the reliable detection of defects,
provided that the calibration and sensitivity of the instru-
mentation are properly selected. If the sensitivity level is
too low, harmful defects may not be detected. Con-
versely, if the level is too high, characteristics of the mate-
rial that are either natural or not significant may be
mistaken for defects.2 9
The NDI procedure's ability to detect the presence of a
crack in a part depends upon a number of factors. These
factors can include:
(1) The location of the crack - surface cracks are more
likely to be detected than cracks below the surface by sim-
ple techniques such as visual inspection, dye penetrant,
magnetic particle, or eddy current. Interior defects are
usually more difficult to detect.
(2) The condition of the surface - clean, well-prepared
surfaces make the detection of cracks much easier. If the
surface is roughened, dirty, oily, or covered with paint,
the coupling of the NDT technique and the surface of the
material containing the defect will be poor, greatly in-
creasing the likelihood that a defect will be missed.
(3) The adjoining structure geometry - cracks usually de-
velop in localized areas of high stress associated with
changes in geometric shape. These changes in shape may
29 Id. at 3.
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decrease the ability of the NDT process to detect the crack
because the adjacent geometry may shield the crack from
the inspection. Typical examples include cracks that de-
velop in the base of threads and cracks that develop under
installed rivet or fastener holes.
(4) The stress on the crack - cracks under compressive
loading are usually forced closed by externally applied
loads. These cracks may be more difficult to find because
it is the "openness" of a crack that aids many NDT proce-
dures by producing a signal that indicates the crack's
presence. The fine crack-like lines formed by compressive
stresses are not easily detected during visual inspections.
Dye penetrant does not enter into tight cracks to produce
visible indications. Similarly, ultrasonic stress waves do
not reflect from tightly closed cracks.
(5) The clarity and completeness of the inspection instructions
before the production, service, or maintenance inspec-
tors can inspect a part, NDI laboratory engineers must de-
velop procedures to detect defects. Instrument sensitivity
settings, specific procedures, and exemplar defects must
be examined to ensure that the inspection process is ade-
quate. These procedures must be agreed upon and be fol-
lowed by the in-service inspectors.
(6) The training, ability, and motivation of the inspector - in
the final analysis, the successful detection of defects de-
pends upon the inspector's ability and motivation. Most
in-service inspections are difficult, demanding, tedious,
and repetitious. To increase the effectiveness of inspec-
tions, more emphasis should be placed on adequately mo-
tivating and compensating inspectors.
The NDI's capabilities for detecting flaws in materials
should be defined during the developmental phase of the
design. Quality Assurance NDT personnel in conjunction
with field inspectors provide an effective transition from
the laboratory to production and field inspections. NDT
procedures called for in the inspection must be carried
out correctly or defects that should be removed may be
missed by the inspection and left in service.
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C. Failure to Detect a Defect During Maintenance
A number of instances of inspectors failing to detect
flaws during their inspections have been documented.
For example, a flaw 4.525 inches long was detected in an
area that had been inspected ultrasonically only 1,000
flight hours earlier.3 0 It is unlikely that the flaw did not
exist during the ultrasonic inspection. Furthermore, an
inspection technique used at one installation may achieve
a certain level of reliability, but may result in a different
level of reliability at a different installation. For example,
a technique that achieves a 90% reliability/95% confi-
dence level (i.e., a technique that is 90% reliable 95% of
the time) at one installation may not achieve this same
level at a different installation. In addition, an installation
may not be able to maintain a specific level of accuracy for
a certain inspection technique over an extended period of
time. Thus, reliability of inspections that may vary signifi-
cantly from installation to installation compounds the
problem of potential low reliability of depot maintenance-
level inspections.
D. Airframe Inspection and Maintenance
Standard aircraft inspection procedures detail the re-
quirements for specific inspections at scheduled times.
Although the manufacturer usually provides a commercial
NDI manual, the Air Transport Association does not spec-
ify or require use of the manual. Many inspection pro-
grams, however, develop their own manuals. Field service
manuals or technical orders often contain references to
NDI. For example, when an aircraft experiences hard
landings, excessive maneuvers, turbulence, lightning
:- See Dornheim, Boeing Methodology Faulted in Assessing Aircraft Conosion, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., July 18, 1988, at 91. Boeing estimated that "a crack could grow
from a visually undetectable size to a 40-in. major failure within 3,000 flight cycles
from the start of a crack .... " Id. Boeing, however, does not address the corro-
sion deterioration problem in its structural inspection document used to inspect
aging aircraft because Boeing assumes that operators keep their aircraft corro-
sion-free. Id. at 91, 93.
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strikes, or other unusual problems, a visual inspection
must be performed, and perhaps an even more detailed
NDT inspection may be required. Both structural repair
instructions and manuals describe basic procedures for
repair of cracked or damaged structures. The instructions
and manuals normally contain acceptance criteria for
cracks, corrosion, or inspections.
To avoid unwanted inspection costs, most parts are
zoned with quality grades based on stress analysis or criti-
cality of part function. Less critical parts require either
less inspection or more time between inspections. Prepa-
ration of an NDI manual is the best way to approach the
problems associated with on-condition maintenance and
depot or base-level inspection.s
:1 D. Hagemaier, supra note 26, at 4-5. The NDI manual is an integral part of
the testing and inspection plan:
An NDI manual is prepared for use during the operational phase of
the aircraft. Techniques are developed to inspect critical areas of
components for potential service damage (cracking, corrosion, or
deformation). NDI technique development is required whenever
one of the following criteria is met:
(1) The NDI method improves safe operation or reliability of the
system or sub-system.
(2) A savings in maintenance costs or manpower will be realized by
using NDI methods.
(3) Operational effectiveness or life cycle costs will be favorably ef-
fective ....
The manual does not contain inspection level or frequency ... ac-
ceptance/rejection limitations, or instructions for correcting defec-
tive conditions. The manual defines:
(1) Area of aircraft to be inspected.
(2) Specific component to be inspected.
(3) Specific location on the component being inspected requiring
special attention (defines defect location and orientation).
(4) Access to area for inspection.
(5) Preparation of area for inspection ....
(6) Defines specific test methods or techniques required to evaluate
component for particular defect or condition ....
(7) Description of equipment required to perform the evaluation.
(8) Description of reference standards (when required) for stan-
dardizing test sensitivity.
Each inspection will, when necessary, specify a verification (back-
up) inspection procedure by another means to verify initial inspec-
tion results. The NDI manual evolves by a well-coordinated and
planned sequence of steps.
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An industrial task force assembled in 1977 attempted to
develop standards for inspecting aging aircraft.3 2 The re-
sponse at that time was to increase the frequency and
scope of maintenance inspections. Normal procedures re-
quired that A-, B-, C-, and possibly D-Level checks on air-
craft be performed within specified numbers of flying
hours .
These inspection and maintenance programs are sensi-
tive to the number of flying hours, but not necessarily sen-
sitive to GAG cycles. The inspection programs and
procedures, as well as time between inspections should
include the difference in operations and loads used by dif-
ferent airlines. A program based on an average mixture
of all types of operations should not be implemented.
Short-haul flying, such as commuter flying, introduces the
highest level of damage per hour of the aircraft's opera-
tion. The GAG cycle of twenty- to forty-minute opera-
tional flight produces more severe fatigue damage than
that produced by a long overseas flight.
One airline has a standard 1,000-flight-hour inspection
for corrosion, fatigue, and other types of cracking. This
inspection occurs regardless of the type of operation the
aircraft undertakes. Pan American Airlines requires a D-
Level check on 747-100s every four to four and one-half
years. In this procedure, essentially all critical moving
parts are examined, and when necessary, are replaced
with new or reconditioned parts. These procedures cost
:- See Independent Research Urged, supra note 22, at 112-13. Ray Valeika, vice presi-
dent of maintenance and engineering with Pan American World Airways, was
chairman of the task force. Id. at 112. Valeika advocates the position that aging
aircraft can be operated safely under the system of inspection, surveillance, and
repair developed by the industry and the federal government. Id. Valeika believes
that airlines deserve more credit for the routine in-depth inspections that identify
problems in early stages. Id.
:... Id. at 113. The B-Level check is done every 1,000 flight hours for the pur-
pose of detecting corrosion and fatigue damage in key areas such as behind the
wing fairings and inside horizontal stabilizers. Id. A D-Level check is more exten-
sive and detailed. On the average, the D-Level check is needed every four to four
and one-half years, Id. A D-Level check may include reskinning the plane. Id. All
movable parts are replaced with new or reconditioned parts. Id. Inspectors may
require that additional work be completed. Id.
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well over $1,000,000 per inspection. 4
An airframe life extension program procedure used by
Boeing-Wichita specifies the inspection and repair of
preselected airframe structural areas. These procedures
involve the inspection of specified portions of the air-
frame that are determined by test or calculation to be
areas of high stress and potential service damage. Any
damage found in these inspections must be repaired. The
structure is assumed to receive a life extension because
defective parts found during an inspection are supposed
to be scrapped or repaired. The assumption a life exten-
sion is based upon is the belief that existing cracks will be
discovered and repaired. Ideally, the inspected and re-
paired structure will be free of flaws and have a lifetime
equal to the lifetime of the original flaw-free structure.
For example, in bolt hole inspections each hole is in-
spected for the presence of cracks. If a crack has a radial
length of 0.03 inches or longer, the inspection process is
likely to detect its presence. Figure 12 in Appendix A
shows an eddy current inspection technique for detecting
cracks under installed bushings. Figure 13 in Appendix A
shows typical probabilities that eddy current inspection
procedures will detect radial cracks in unfilled fastener
holes.3 1 If a crack is detected, removal by successive one-
sixteenth inch reams until the crack indication disappears
I:' ld. The procedure is cost effective because replacement of the aircraft would
cost approximately $130 million. Pan American believes that the D-Level check
produces an aircraft that is equivalent to a new one. Id.
- Hagemaier, Bates & Steinberg, On-Aircraft Eddy Cun'ent Subsurface Crack Inspec-
tion, 46 MATERIALS EVALUATION 518, 518 (1988). Subsurface crack detection is
accomplished using phase analysis eddy current (i.e., current induced by an alter-
nating magnetic field) instruments which produce impedance plane responses au-
tomatically on a CRT. Id. Figure 12 in Appendix A illustrates eddy current
inspection for cracks under an installed bushing. To establish a reference stan-
dard, an eddy current probe is inserted into a bushed hole in metal of similar
thickness and composition to that of the aircraft metal. Id. An operating fre-
quency is selected that allows the eddy currents to penetrate the bushing to detect
a notch precut in the metal to simulate a crack. Id. Using the generated CRT
image as a reference standard, the bolt hole probe is inserted into bolt holes on
the aircraft to detect existing cracks. Id. The depth of eddy current penetration is
a function of operating frequency, material conductivity, and material magnetic
permeability. Id. at 521-22. As illustrated in Figure 13 of Appendix A, the mini-
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is allowed as long as the number of reams does not ex-
ceed a preselected number, for example, three. If an eddy
current inspection determines that a hole is crack-free, a
final oversized one-sixteenth inch diameter ream will re-
move any undetected cracks that are less than 0.03 inches
in length.
E. Conclusion: Airframe Inspection
The technical problem with maintaining safety for ag-
ing airframes is knowing where to look for cracking, and
developing reliable procedures for finding the initial small
cracks. The present system of inspecting, maintaining,
and repairing aircraft should be strengthened. Alterna-
tive methods should be considered for establishing limita-
tions on the lives of components, inspection intervals, and
some training standardizations for inspectors. The
United States Navy uses full-scale fatigue tests to deter-
mine useful safe life. If the Navy anticipates additional
use, it commissions new tests that go beyond the initial
design life. It seems reasonable to require further fatigue-
substantiation tests for commercial aircraft that will deter-
mine the life extension of critical structures. The evalua-
tion of in-service hold times, environmental effects, and
corrosion, which affect the validity of life extension esti-
mates, make the application of these tests to real struc-
tures difficult.
Increased federal and industrial support needs to be
made available for both applied and directed research and
development (R&D) programs dealing with the technical
aspects of in-service crack detection. Programs designed
to examine the human factors and management processes
involved in inspection and repair should also be empha-
sized. The FAA needs to involve more inspectors who are
trained to make major maintenance checks. The FAA
should also evaluate projects designed to produce more
mum detectable crack length is determined by the thickness of the aluminum
structure under examination. Id. at 522.
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reliable NDT procedures. In addition, the FAA needs to
have more specialists who can conduct field visits to deter-
mine the human factors associated with problems of de-
fect detection, particularly routine inspections.
Moreover, nationwide attention should be focused on the
need to educate and train more engineers, technicians,
and maintenance personnel in the reliability of NDT and
more advanced techniques. NDT, particularly in field in-
spection, is presently a lower level job that is mundane,
boring, and one out of which people would like to be
promoted.36
An R&D program aimed at gathering and distributing
inspection procedures, training procedures, and other
factors needed to improve the reliability of NDT should
be established. In the late 1970s, the United States Air
Force and the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the
Department of Defense established such a basic research
program, but it is no longer in effect. The primary aim of
the project was directed toward advanced NDT research
that could be used in advanced military aircraft. The
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has also sup-
ported an NDT research and development program and
has established an NDT center. The EPRI center, how-
ever, is dedicated to power plant and nuclear inspection
procedures that apply to aircraft only marginally.
Industry does not appear to object to more stringent
requirements if the requirements address and resolve
safety problems. Hasty and ill-conceived requirements
:w Independent Research Urged, supra note 22, at 112. Some experts maintain that
research and development efforts in the inspection and maintenance of aircraft
should be premised upon the preference for an engineering approach over a
political solution. Id. An independent research effort would more likely appreci-
ate and account for the different ways airlines operate aircraft and avoid problems
inherent in establishing a single standard for all airlines. Id. Proponents contend
that a systematic approach to safety is preferable to the reactionary method em-
ployed by the FAA. Id. at 113. Private industry or government agencies other
than the FAA, such as NASA, are proposed as better suited to undertake research
and development efforts because of their immunity from the rule-making process.
Id.
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would therefore significantly increase inspection costs,
create confusion, and not truly increase safety.
IV. DURABILITY AND RELIABILITY
A. Durability
Aircraft structural systems must meet stringent strength
demands, be resistant to cracking, and allow for sufficient
structural back-up structure to ensure that fail-safe re-
quirements are met. At the same time, the entire flying
system must meet economic, range, and fuel cost require-
ments. It must also meet requirements for durability and
structural integrity during its operational lifetime. The
durability requirements for an aircraft are designed to es-
timate the inspection and repairs that may need to be per-
formed on the structure as it ages.
In a durability analysis, the total economic costs of in-
specting and repairing the aircraft during its design life-
time are important. For example, if an aircraft is to be
flown for 100,000 hours of operation, a durable design is
one that does not require major reworking or inspection
of primary structural components, particularly fastener or
rivet holes, until after the 100,000 hours. Thus, durability
could be considered analytically to be a measure of the
total number of repairs and the cost of those repairs that
must be made on the aircraft structure within the assumed
life of the aircraft. 7
37 Yang, Statistical Estimation of Economic Lifefor Aircraft Structures, 17 J. AIRCRAFT
528 (1980). Statistical methods for predicting the economic life of critical compo-
nents of aircraft structures have been developed. Id. at 534. The formulas ac-
count for various conditions, such as any type of initial fatigue quality, crack
growth damage accumulation, loading spectra, material/structural properties, us-
age change, and inspection and repair maintenance. Id. at 528. The formulations
allow for the determination of economic life using either of the following two
criteria: (I) a rapid increase in the number of crack damages exceeding the eco-
nomic repair crack size, or (2) a rapid increase in the maintenance cost. Id. It has
been demonstrated numerically that the percentage of cracks exceeding the eco-
nomic repair crack size increases rapidly after a certain time, thus determining the
component's economic life. Id. While the inspection and repair maintenance pro-
cedure has a significant impact on the safety and reliability of aircraft structures,
its effect on the economic life of a component is limited. Id.
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A durable structure is defined as one for which the
number of flight hours until repairs are required is
greater than one design lifetime. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 14 of Appendix A, in which a structural component's
crack size is plotted against the component's lifetime.
The initial flaw size is not a single value, as used in the
slow crack growth design, but rather includes all of the
defects assumed to be present in the structure at the in-
ception of service. The scatter in flaw initiation sizes rep-
resents variability of materials as well as manufacturing
variability throughout the structure. Some of these de-
fects may grow faster than others, resulting in the spread-
ing out of the scatter band that represents the distribution
of defects at any time in the aircraft's history.
A durability analysis focuses on the number of cracks
and the number of hours of operation after which the
cracks will grow to exceed a given flaw size. This size is
usually 0.03 inches, which would be the detectable flaw
size growing from a fastener hole. As the initial defect
distribution grows and disperses, the total distribution of
defects in the component approaches the inspectable flaw
size of 0.03 inches. If a large percentage of the fastener
holes do not develop cracks larger than 0.03 inches until
after one design life (100,000 hours), the design is consid-
ered to be a durable structure. 8
Attaining durability is a difficult task. Durability analy-
sis is a complex design process and is difficult to verify
prior to use. The actual component may be subject to un-
!I, See Rudd & Gray, Qualification of Fastener Hole Quality, 5 J. AIRCRAFT 143
(1978). Rudd and Gray give one example of a durability analysis, the Equivalent
Initial Quality Method. This test assumes that defects or initiation of cracks result-
ing from imperfections in either the manufacturing of the structural component
or in the material itself are present at the onset of the aircraft's life. The article
gives a description of the test and applies it to fastener holes, which are the most
prevalent source of cracking in aircraft structures. Specifically, it describes how a
statistical distribution may be used to determine fastener hole quality resulting
from certain manufacturing processes. The article then applies the test to two
aircraft, the F-4 C/D and the A-7D. The conclusion is that this test may be used in
the future to determine the acceptability of certain manufacturing procedures, re-
quired inspection intervals, and maintenance and modification schedules. Id.
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expected and unidentified operational exposures that the
analysis verification does not account for. The durability
fatigue analysis process is not as well developed as the du-
rability analysis for a static (one load application) case.
Typical approaches that compensate for fatigue damage
variability in aircraft structures usually range from selec-
tion of arbitrary scatter factors such as two or four, to the
use of computational cycle-by-cycle life analysis, which
tracks each aircraft individually. The problem is one of
characterizing the scatter in fatigue behavior, in expected
load history, in the initial material properties, and in man-
ufacturing processes by fitting a statistical distribution to
the observed data. The likely or average performance and
its associated safety factor, which will assure an adequate
margin of safety for the structure, are then determined.
Success is measured by the accuracy with which the se-
lected distribution and parameters replicate the observed
scatter of the actual fleet's fatigue performance.
B. Reliability
The concept of structural reliability as applied to older
aircraft refers to the ability to predict the location and
number of fatigue cycles that apply to each aircraft to pro-
duce a detectable flaw. The appearance of unexpected fa-
tigue damage usually occurs first as a crack and is
followed by subsequent growth, which causes the failure.
If this fatigue damage remains hidden and is not removed,
the function and safety of operational structures may be
compromised and serious economic consequences may
result. Fatigue damage can appear early in the structure's
life. If it is shown that the damage results from a fleet-
wide problem rather than an isolated incident, then obvi-
ously the component is not reliable as designed. The
structure must be replaced or repaired, and the aircraft's
use must be restricted.
As the aircraft ages, any a priori prediction of the struc-
ture's reliability becomes more difficult. The total struc-
ture undergoes a large number of cycles as well as
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exposure to the environment. As the number of potential
sites for fatigue and corrosion damage increases with age,
predicting the location of the damage becomes more diffi-
cult. In addition, the varied usage of each individual air-
craft increases the scatter in the distribution of flaw
growth, which also decreases the accuracy of the
prediction. 9
Remedial steps for fatigue repair are not simple be-
cause of the cumulative effects of the fatigue cycling. Re-
pair of a fatigue defect in one location does not preclude
the presence of another defect in an immediately adjacent
location. Fatigue damage initiation and propagation con-
tinue over the total life of the system.
The major problem associated with a statistical ap-
proach to the fatigue damage-reliability problem is identi-
fying the tail of the distribution of the damage curves.
The central tendency properties, mean, median, standard
deviation, and characteristic life can be estimated by ex-
amining a few experimental test values. The reliability,
and associated safety, of a single aircraft is represented by
the time-to-first failure rather than the time-to-average
failure. Current FAA Advisory Directive procedures are
based on the discovery and recognition of the first failure.
When the FAA gathers sufficient information indicating
that the failure is a reliability problem instead of a series
of isolated incidents, remedial action for the total fleet is
taken.
The current United States Air Force philosophy, which
is based on the concept of initial flaws or preflaws in every
critical component, assumes that each component is
designed so that it will fail first. This philosophy is ex-
tremely conservative and often excessively expensive.
:... See Hart-Smith, supra note 18 discussing examples of these problems of lack
of structural reliability. One example of the scope of the problem is presented by
the McDonnell Douglas C-133 Cargomaster transport aircraft. The cracks in this
aircraft that caused an explosive decompression were not caused by structural
stress concentration, but instead by pressure pulses from the tips of the propeller
blades. Unfortunately, the result was the same: a long thin crack developed and
caused the decompression. Id.
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The question of whether it truly increases the airframe's
reliability remains unanswered.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Aircraft structural systems are designed to be safe for a
finite fatigue life, with the implied knowledge that fatigue
cracking will occur over the aircraft's life. The continued
safety of any aging aircraft can be maintained and ensured
only by continued inspection. The safety of the aircraft
thus depends upon the thoroughness, sensitivity, and suc-
cess of the inspection procedure. The material properties
of crack growth rate, material sensitivity to crack growth
parameters, environmental effects such as corrosion, and
residual strength in the presence of known crack-like flaws
are important parameters in the formulation of any sur-
veillance scheme. The interval between the time a crack is
first formed and the time at which the crack has grown to
a size detectable by overhaul inspection or inspections
prior to the growth of the crack to a critical size provides
the only opportunity to locate and remove the damage.
The success of any of these procedures depends on the
sensitivity and reliability of the inspection and the inspec-
tors.40 This places a high degree of responsibility on the
inspection program, managers, and line inspectors. To
ensure the safety of an aging aircraft fleet will require
more resources and management concern directed to-
ward this technical area.
See Independent Research Urged, supra note 22, for further discussion of
problems with the current system of inspection and maintenance.
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APPENDIX A
The Trouble-Prone Rivets on 737'sA row of rivets would be replaced on early-model Boeing jets neareach of 10 stringers, the metal strips running front to back that formpart of the shell of the plane. Sections of the aluminum skin areattached to the stringers and to each other in panels that overlaplike shingles on a roof. The top row of rivets, targeted for
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where the rivet
L...;-NEW RIVETButtonhead typeprotrudes from skin,
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RESIDUAL STATIC STRENGTH (PSI)
ULTIMATE STRENGTH ULTIMATE LOAD
---. DEFORMATION LOAD UMIT LOAD __-
MAXIMUM DESIGN LOAD
AVG.SERVICE UFE
TIME, FLIGHT HOURS OR CYCLES
FIGURE 3.. FATIGUE LIFE OF AIRFRAME.
Residual Static strength decreases as a function of time or cycles on
the aircraft.
2. FLAW INITATION TIME AVG SERVICE LIFE
TIME, FLIGHT HOURS OR CYCLES
FIGURE 4..DEFECT SIZE VS FLIGHT HOURS.
Growth of the flaw that reduces the residual static strength.
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PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
TIME,FLIGHT HOURS OR CYCLES
1 2 3 4
DESIGN LIFETIMES
FIGURE 5.. SAFE LIFE FATIGUE DESIGN
Based on unflawed data and Miner's cumulative damage calculation
for mean fatigue life.
2 3 4
LIFETIMES
FIGURE 6..SHORTCOMINGS OF SAFE LIFE DESIGN
Any individual aircraft could exhibit poor correlation between test
and service life experience
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Figure 7
Examples of Early Service Life Failures
Shortcomings of Safe Life Design
Structural Failure
F-4 Wing failure













Figure 8. FAIL SAFE DESIGN - The structure is designed to contain





TIMEFLIGHT HOURS OR CYCLES
FIGURE 9.. SAFE LIFE, SLOW CRACK GROWTH DESIGN
Structure is designed and inspected so that maximum expected
initial damage will not grow to critical size in 1 design life.
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INITIAL PRIMARY DAMAGE FOR DEPOT OR BASE LEVEL




LOCATION OTHER THAN FASTENER HOLE
INITIAL PRIMARY DAMAGE FOR NONINSPECTABLE AND DEPOT
OR BASE LEVEL INSPECTABLE STRUCTURE WITH COMPONENT
REMOVAL (SLOW CRACK GROWTH STRUCTURE)
S 
.05t







LOCATION DINER THAN FASTENER HOLE
FIGURE 10 SIZE OF INITIAL DAMAGE USED IN CALCULATION FORSLOW CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS. (MIL-A-83444; MIL A-
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FIGURE 12 EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION FOR CRACKS UNDER
INSTALLED BUSHING (A) TYPICAL LOCATION (B) BOLT
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(mm) 5 10
surface detectable crack length
(S)
Figure 13. Detectable Crack Length for Eddy Current Inspection of
Alumnium Airframes (Ref. Hagamier, etal.)
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FLAW SIZE (INCHES)
1 DESIGN UFE
TIME, FLIGHT HOURS OR CYCLES
FIGURE 14.. DURABILITY ANALYSIS
Measure of the number of defects that will grow to require repair
(0.030) or larger in one lifetime.
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